Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands by Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara
The Australian government’s 5 June 2003 decision to lead a Paciﬁc
Islands Forum (pif) regional intervention into Solomon Islands marked a
dramatic change in Australian policy toward the Solomons in particular
and the Paciﬁc Islands region in general. It demonstrated Canberra’s will-
ingness to play a more assertive role in the domestic affairs of Island coun-
tries. Prior to June 2003, Australian authorities had ruled out any possi-
bility of deploying military or police to help Solomon Islands subdue the
civil unrest that has affected the country since late 1998 and they had
ignored requests for assistance from two previous Solomon Islands prime
ministers. Canberra’s June 2003 decision reﬂected a fundamental change
in the global security environment following the 11 September 2001
attacks on the United States; it also illustrates the perception (held partic-
ularly by some western countries) that international terrorism has made
it difﬁcult to separate external and internal security. 
To understand the change in Australia’s policy, one must examine not
only events in Solomon Islands but also the nature of Anglo-American
security policies, as well as Australia’s collaboration with the United States
and Great Britain in the war against international terrorism. Anglo-Amer-
ican security discourse in turn has inﬂuenced the approach of the Austral-
ian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi), espe-
cially its focus on strengthening a “failed” state to prevent terrorists from
manipulating it and threatening Australia. 
The state is important in the context of global security. But the effort
to build sustainable peace in Solomon Islands raises other questions: Who
controls the state? Can a strong state apparatus alone create a stable
nation committed to a shared identity and mission among its peoples?
And is the state the only institution that can facilitate peace building and
national reconstruction? 
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To achieve sustainable peace and rebuild Solomon Islands, I argue that
both state and non-state entities must be strengthened there. This is espe-
cially important in a plural society where the state will always share and
compete for power with other organizations. Furthermore, the Regional
Assistance Mission must not become so dominant that it creates depen-
dency—as illustrated by the local saying, “Weitim olketa ramsi bae kam
stretem” (Wait for ramsi to come and ﬁx it)—or is perceived as an occu-
pation. If Solomon Islands stability is important for global (and Austral-
ian) security, then it is vital that the intervention enhances rather than
undermines local capacity for change.
Solomon Islands Civil Unrest: A Background
To understand what happened, it is valuable to brieﬂy outline the issues
and events that engendered the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mis-
sion. Detailed discussions of the civil unrest are covered elsewhere (eg,
Nori 2001; Kabutaulaka 2001, 2002; Bennett 2002; Dinnen 2003).
Canberra’s decision to lead a Paciﬁc Islands Forum intervention came
exactly three years to the day after a coup forced then Solomon Islands
Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu out of ofﬁce, and also three years
after the pif countries signed the Biketawa Declaration, which facilitates
cooperation among member countries on issues of security. 
The coup was the culmination of violent civil unrest that began in late
1998 when some young men from the island of Guadalcanal—where the
capital, Honiara, is located—started a campaign of harassment and intim-
idation targeting settlers from other islands, especially those from the
neighboring and populous island of Malaita. The group was formerly
known as the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, then as the Isatabu Free-
dom Fighters, before settling in with the name the Isatabu Freedom Move-
ment (ifm). In the months that followed, the ifm campaign became vio-
lent and involved murders, rape, and the forceful eviction of thousands
of settlers. The movement raised various issues, including allegations of
disrespect by settlers, claims for rent for the use of Honiara as a national
capital, and demands for a federal system of government—known locally
as the “state government system.” The demands were laid out in a docu-
ment that the Guadalcanal Provincial Government submitted to the Solo-
mon Islands central government in February 1999 (gpg 1999).
By mid-1999, ifm activities had become overtly violent. For example,
an ifm member noted in his diary on 12 June 1999: “About 300 armed
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malahai [warriors] marched to cdc5,1 attacked the area around 3 pm.
About 6 people from Mala [Malaita] died right on the spot. Three police
trucks arrived and a helicopter. The chopper sprayed bullets on us. Thou-
sands of people evacuated from [the] cdc [area]” (conﬁdential source).
By July 1999, an estimated 20,000 people—mostly Malaitans—had been
evicted from settlements on Guadalcanal. Over time the effects of the
unrest were more widespread: The closure of major industries like the
Gold Ridge gold mine and Solomon Islands Plantation Ltd on Guadal-
canal negatively affected the economy; many Guadalcanal people left
Honiara and either went back to rural Guadalcanal or to their spouses’
villages; the large number of people returning to villages placed heavy
pressure on village resources and services; and relationships between peo-
ple of different provinces was generally tense.
The Ulufa‘alu-led Solomon Islands Alliance for Change government set
up a task force and attempted to negotiate with the Isatabu Freedom
Movement and address the plight of the displaced people. The govern-
ment requested help from the Commonwealth Secretariat, which subse-
quently appointed former Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka as the sec-
retariat’s special envoy to assist with the negotiations. A small contingent
of unarmed police ofﬁcers from Fiji and Vanuatu was also deployed. 
Rabuka facilitated a number of meetings between the Solomon Islands
central government, the Guadalcanal Provincial Government, and ifm
leaders, which resulted in the signing of the Panatina Agreement, the
Honiara Peace Accord, and the Buala Agreement. These documents com-
mitted the government to recognizing and addressing the issues raised by
the Isatabu Freedom Movement, and required the movement to give up
arms—but they never did so, and the government, despite setting up a task
force to address the issues surrounding the civil unrest, never addressed
them before being deposed in June 2000.
Displaced Malaitans in Honiara formed a committee to pressure the
government to deal with their plight. Many had lost property and had rel-
atives murdered, harassed, or raped, and they wanted the government to
help them rebuild their lives (Nori 2001). By the beginning of 2000 some
displaced Malaitans, frustrated with the government’s perceived inaction
and its inability to apprehend Guadalcanal militants, formed their own
rival militant organization, the Malaita Eagle Force (mef). Located in
Honiara, this group was supported by some prominent Malaita leaders
and business people such as Andrew Nori, Alex Bartlett, and Rolland
Timo. The Malaita Eagle Force, in collusion with Malaitans in the Royal
286 the contemporary pacific • 17:2 (2005)
Solomon Islands Police (rsip), began attacking Guadalcanal villages and
ifm strongholds on the outskirts of Honiara. 
On 5 June 2000 the Malaita Eagle Force, with the support of elements
of the police, took over the rsip armory in Honiara and forced the res-
ignation of Prime Minister Ulufa‘alu, himself a Malaitan from Langa-
langa. The main reason given for the “takeover” was the government’s
perceived delay in “seriously and urgently” addressing the ethnic uprising.
The Malaita Eagle Force claimed that the prime minister seemed to have
done little to stop the conﬂict (Fugui 2001). On 30 June 2000, the national
parliament was summoned under duress, and Manasseh Sogavare from
Choiseul was elected prime minister, beating a fellow Choiseulese, Bishop
Leslie Boseto, 23 votes to 21. In the weeks that followed, the confronta-
tion between the Isatabu Freedom Movement and the Malaita Eagle Force
intensiﬁed and an unconﬁrmed number of people were killed. 
Despite this, local civil society organizations such as the Solomon
Islands Christian Association, Women for Peace, and the Tasiu (Melane-
sian Brotherhood), a religious order belonging to the Church of Melane-
sia (Anglican Church), continued to facilitate negotiations between the
conﬂicting parties. The Australian and New Zealand governments assisted
these efforts by sponsoring the venues for negotiation on board their war-
ships. On 2 August 2000 a ceaseﬁre agreement was signed aboard an Aus-
tralian Navy ship, the hmas Tobruk. Less than twenty-four hours after
it was signed, however, the ceaseﬁre agreement collapsed when a mef
member was killed at Kakabona, a periurban village west of Honiara.
Despite this, negotiations continued under the auspices of the Australian
and New Zealand governments, leading to the signing of the Townsville
Peace Agreement on 15 October 2000.
As I elaborate in a later section, the peace agreement, while providing
a ceaseﬁre between the two major conﬂicting parties, did not solve many
of the problems emanating from the civil unrest nor address the underly-
ing causes (see also Kabutaulaka 2002).
During the height of the unrest, the Solomon Islands government
requested assistance from Australia and New Zealand. In 2000, for exam-
ple, Prime Minister Ulufa‘alu asked for armed police and military assis-
tance to handle the law-and-order problem because of concerns that the
Royal Solomon Islands Police was compromised by ethnic divisions. His
successor, Manasseh Sogavare, made a similar appeal in 2001. Both
requests were ignored. 
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Australian authorities insisted that although they were willing to pro-
vide advice and ﬁnancial support, the deployment of Australian police and
military personnel was out of the question. For example, Australian For-
eign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer stated:
Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly in
the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Paciﬁc region. It would be
difﬁcult to justify to Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would
such an occupation have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy?
The real show-stopper, however, is that it would not work . . . foreigners do
not have answers for the deep-seated problems afﬂicting Solomon Islands.
(The Australian, 8 Jan 2003, quoted in Wright 2003)
This position of principle changed dramatically six months later, when
the Australian government decided to sponsor and lead a regional assis-
tance mission to Solomon Islands. Downer retracted his earlier statement
and said that the Solomon Islands civil unrest had “forced” Australia to
produce a new Paciﬁc policy involving “nation rebuilding” and “co-oper-
ative intervention.” He also stressed, however, that the initiative was
built on the spirit of the Paciﬁc Islands Forum’s Biketawa Declaration and
the need to cooperate on matters of regional security: “This is much more
the implementation of the Biketawa Declaration under what I call the
heading of co-operative intervention, than being something completely
new. It’s evolutionary, not revolutionary” (abc Radio 2003b).
To appreciate why Australian policy changed, it is useful to discuss the
Solomon Islands civil unrest within the context of the Anglo-American–
led war against international terrorism and the kind of discourses and
imageries associated with it. 
Concerns for Internal Instability and 
External Threats 
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September
2001, Anglo-American–led discussions of security shifted from a concen-
tration on inter- and intra-state conﬂicts (which had characterized the
previous era) to threats from non-state terrorist organizations. White
House spokesman Ari Fleischer, for example, stated that “the threats
we face are no longer from known enemies, nations that have ﬂeets or
missiles or bombers that we can see come to the United States, nations
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that can be deterred through previous notions such as mutually assured
destruction or any other previous defence notions” (abc Radio 2002b).
It was also recognized that while terrorist organizations might not neces-
sarily have formal relationships with conventional states, they could
exploit unstable and vulnerable ones as well as those controlled by
extreme religious fundamentalist organizations such as the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
The targets of terrorist attacks are predominantly, but not exclusively,
western democratic countries such as the United States, Great Britain,
Spain, and Australia. For these countries, the security challenge is not only
to prevent attack within their territories, but also to ensure that terrorists
do not manipulate internal instabilities and ineffective states to target their
interests abroad. 
These concerns engendered the Bush administration’s doctrine of “pre-
emptive strike” and provided the impetus for foreign intervention in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Solomon Islands. Although the nature of these
conﬂicts, the contexts in which they occurred, and the issues involved
might have differed greatly, the objectives and rationale for intervention
were similar. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, the purpose was to
get rid of an existing regime and replace it with one friendly to—if not
controlled by—the intervening power. The removal of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s administration in Iraq was justiﬁed
by the argument that these regimes not only repressed their own people
but also collaborated with international terrorists. In the case of Iraq,
Hussein was also alleged to have possessed weapons of mass destruction
that could potentially have been made available to terrorists. 
In Solomon Islands, intervention was justiﬁed by perceptions that inter-
nal instability could pose a threat for Australia (aspi 2003). To under-
stand why Canberra changed its policy in relation to the Southwest Paciﬁc
in general and Solomon Islands in particular, we need to examine Aus-
tralia’s alliance with the United States and Britain in the war against ter-
rorism. Following the attack on the World Trade Center, Australia played
an active role in the war against Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida ter-
rorist organization in Afghanistan. It later participated as a member of
the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” in the war against Saddam Hussein
in Iraq, and as a committed ally of the United States in the broader west-
ern war against terrorism. 
While there is no evidence to suggest that Washington dictated Can-
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berra’s policies toward the Paciﬁc Islands, it would be fair to say that
those policies were inﬂuenced by the Bush administration’s agenda. Aus-
tralian Prime Minister John Howard, for example, stated that he would
launch a preemptive strike against terrorists in another country if he had
evidence they were about to attack Australia, because “it stands to rea-
son that if you believed that somebody was going to launch an attack
against your country, either of a conventional kind or of a terrorist kind,
and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternative other than
to use that capacity, then of course you would have to use it” (abc Radio
2002a). He went on to say that international law could no longer cope
with the changed circumstances confronting the world, where the most
likely threat to any nation’s sovereignty was non-state terrorism. He
asserted that weak states that cannot impose order over their societies
could be vulnerable to terrorist manipulation (abc Radio 2002a).
When asked whether his statement implied his government’s willing-
ness to mount military attack (or preemptive strike) against its Southeast
Asian neighbors, Howard said that “it related to the determination of this
government to take legitimate measures if other alternatives were not
available, if there were a clear, precise, identiﬁable threat” (Australia
2002, 9260).
Such statements attracted widespread criticism across Asia and added
to discontent associated with the so-called “Howard Doctrine,” which
was ﬁrst articulated in late 1999. The Howard Doctrine suggests that
Australia has a new role as the United States’ peacekeeping “deputy” in
the Asia-Paciﬁc region. As Howard said, Australia “has a particular
responsibility to do things above and beyond in this part of the world”
and was prepared to take a role as the “deputy” of the United States in
the region. (It should be noted, however, that Howard did not actually
use the term “deputy sheriff” for the United States—that was journalist
Fred Brenchley’s interpretation of what Howard said in a 1999 interview
for the Bulletin.) In referring to Australia’s role as leader of the multina-
tional force into East-Timor, Howard said:
Despite the inevitable tensions that are involved in East Timor and some of
the sensitivities, this has done a lot to cement Australia’s place in the region.
We have been seen by countries, not only in the region but around the world,
as being able to do something that probably no other country could do,
because of the special characteristics we have, because we occupy a special
place—we are European Western civilization with strong links with North
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America, but here we are in Asia. . . . In foreign policy we spent too much time
fretting about whether we were in Asia, part of Asia, or whatever. We should
be ourselves in Asia. (Scoop NewsAgent, 23 Sept 1999)
The Howard Doctrine, like the idea of preemptive strike, attracted much
criticism from Southeast Asian leaders concerned about Australia’s asser-
tive role in the region, claiming that it smacked of arrogance. In Malay-
sia, the international affairs bureau chairman of the youth wing of Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad’s United Malays’ National Organisation
Party reportedly said: “It only conﬁrms our earlier stand that Australia is
a stooge of the United States. What moral right do they have to claim the
position as the policeman for Asia?” (Asia Times Online 1999).
Malaysia Deputy Home Minister Azmi Khalid observed that the peace-
keeping mission in East Timor was an isolated case and Australia’s role
there could be assumed to apply to the larger picture: “We are actually
fed up with their stance—that they are sitting in a white chair and super-
vising the colored chairs” (Asia Times Online 1999).
Despite widespread skepticism in Southeast Asia, most Paciﬁc Island
leaders were relatively less critical of Australia’s assertive role in the region.
At the Paciﬁc Islands Forum meeting in August 2003, Howard was able
to inﬂuence the pif agenda and have an Australian elected as secretary-
general of the Forum Secretariat. It seemed Island leaders had accepted
that Oceania was Australia’s “patch” in global security. The only criticism
of this doctrine came from PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare, who
expressed concerns about Australia’s desire to have more control over how
its aid money was spent in that country (Chin 2003). The absence of a crit-
ical reaction to Australia’s assertive role might be partly because many
Island leaders wanted Australia to have more visible presence in the region,
after it was criticized in previous pif meetings for neglecting the Paciﬁc
Islands in the disbursement of its aid and in trade relations.
Washington, on the other hand, openly welcomed Australia’s leadership
in the Oceania region, and its willingness to carry out preemptive strikes.
The White House saw Howard’s position as reﬂective of US policy, and
spokesman Ari Fleisher said that the non-state nature of the enemy
“requires a fresh approach to protect the country. Other nations think it
through as well, and come to similar conclusions. Australia has been a
stalwart ally of the US in the war on terror” (abc Radio 2002b).
The partnership between Canberra and Washington was further
cemented in early May 2003 during Howard’s visit to the Bush family
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ranch in Texas. Following that visit, Howard signaled his readiness to
involve Australia in further “coalitions for action” to confront global
security threats: “Our participation as a US ally in the War on Terror
might attract some criticism. But a weaker or equivocal response to this
threat would not serve Australia well, or decrease our vulnerability. And
this would not reduce the prospect of US and other foreign interests being
targeted in Australia, with the inevitable loss of Australian lives, or of Aus-
tralians abroad being incidental victims of terrorism” (Australia 2003).
Claiming an “immense moral and humanitarian dividend” from the US-
led war on Iraq, and citing Australia’s proposal for armed intervention in
Solomon Islands, Howard said that Australia was now enjoying “unpar-
alleled world respect” for its willingness to take a stand (Howard 2003). 
Solomon Islands, therefore, became important for Australia only when
it was seen that terrorists could use the instability to build bases, create
alliances, and pose a threat for Australia, Australian citizens, and their
interests (aspi 2003), as was tragically demonstrated by the Bali bomb-
ing of October 2002, where eighty-eight Australian citizens were killed.
This brought home to Australians the threat of terrorism and explained
in part why Australia chose not to intervene in the Paciﬁc until 2003. The
Howard government was quick to capture this Australian realization,
saying “the terrorist attacks in the US and Bali, and the arrests in Singa-
pore, Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia demonstrate the reach of
terrorism and show that our region is no longer immune”; it was also
quick to highlight the links between Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaida (Aus-
tralia 2003, 18).
The importance of restoring stability in Solomon Islands also came to
the fore because of allegations that Indonesia—with a huge Muslim pop-
ulation and home of Jemaah Islamiah—offered to provide military assis-
tance to Solomon Islands (sbs tv 2003). Although it is unclear whether
the Solomon Islands government ever asked Indonesia for police or mili-
tary assistance, it would not be surprising if that possibility inﬂuenced
Canberra’s decision to intervene. 
The “Failed State” of Solomon Islands
Australia’s concern about internal instability in Solomon Islands and the
potential for terrorists to exploit the situation was compounded by what
was perceived as the increasing failure of the Solomon Islands state. This
“failure” assumed that earlier the Solomon Islands state had been func-
292 the contemporary pacific • 17:2 (2005)
tioning effectively but suddenly failed as a consequence of the civil unrest.
This, of course, is debatable, because one could argue that it was the inef-
fectiveness of the state that caused the unrest. Here, however, I concen-
trate on why the Solomon Islands state was said to have failed. 
The signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement ended the overt vio-
lence between the Isatabu Freedom Movement and Malaita Eagle Force
by creating a permanent albeit imperfect ceaseﬁre. As required under the
agreement, an International Peace Monitoring Team was deployed in
2001 to impound weapons surrendered under the disarmament program.
The team consisted of Australians, New Zealanders, Cook Islanders, and
Ni-Vanuatu. Its local counterpart, the Peace Monitoring Council, was
assigned to “monitor and enforce” the agreement, by having a presence
especially on Guadalcanal and Malaita and encouraging communities to
reconcile and former militants to hand in their weapons. 
However, by the time the Townsville Peace Agreement expired in Octo-
ber 2002, the weapons surrender was only partly successful. In April 2001
it was estimated that about 500 high-powered guns remained in the com-
munities, in the hands of “former” militants (Hegarty 2001). Criminals
continued to operate with impunity in a situation of fragile peace and
latent war, where general law-and-order problems continued. There was
violence, not necessarily between the original parties to the conﬂict, but
within the society at large. With the signing of the peace agreement, con-
ﬂicts emerged within Guadalcanal and Malaita communities, making the
situation complex because it could no longer be described as a conﬂict
between two island groups. 
The civil unrest set in place a structure and culture of violence that per-
meated even the highest institutions of the state. In some cases, former
militants teamed up with corrupt politicians, police ofﬁcers, and public
servants to commit crimes and extort millions of dollars from the gov-
ernment in the guise of the local custom of compensation. Individuals and
non-state groups subverted and used state infrastructure to build and cul-
tivate cliental relationships that facilitated and sustained vibrant and
often ﬁnancially lucrative arrangements to beneﬁt themselves and chosen
associates. It was a situation in which state structures never completely
collapsed but were subverted and utilized to serve the interests of a self-
deﬁned and privileged few. Some people in the government, the police,
and the public service in general increasingly cultivated cliental relation-
ships, used state institutions to serve their interests, and extorted money
from the state coffers (Kabutaulaka 2002; aspi 2003).
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The capacity of the state to effectively and efﬁciently manage the econ-
omy, provide basic services, and create a situation of respect for law and
order was dramatically weakened. The country’s economy deteriorated
further, undermining the government’s ability to provide and maintain
adequate social services. Gross Domestic Product (gdp) fell by 14 percent
in 2000 and 10 percent in 2001. Between 1996 and 2001 exports had
declined 60 percent and gdp per capita had halved in real terms since
independence in 1978 (aspi 2003, 5).
The performances of successive governments were poor, creating a sit-
uation in which people no longer trusted governments. In 1998 a local
nongovernmental organization, the Solomon Islands Development Trust,
conducted a survey in which more than 2,500 citizens nationwide were
asked to assess the performance of successive governments in four major
areas: health services, education opportunities, resource assistance, and
the availability of income-generating opportunities. Table I shows that in
all cases, none of the governments received an approval rating higher than
61 (out of 100) for their performance in any of these categories.
By mid-2003, the country’s debt was registered at a$352 million, more
than three times the country’s annual budget. The governor of the Cen-
tral Bank, Rick Hou, issued a statement reporting that since 1999 the
government had defaulted on all interest as well as some principal pay-
ments, and had failed to bring spending under control (abc News, 10
June 2003).
This situation was described vividly by the Central Bank of Solomon
Islands: “Since 2000, the Solomon Islands economy had severely con-
tracted causing a fall in incomes, increased unemployment and widespread
poverty, and the poor delivery of social services, particularly in the edu-
cation and health sectors. In fact, without the goodwill of the donor com-
munity, services in these two important sectors would have discontinued
early in the year” (cbsi 2003, 6).
Government employees were regularly either paid late or not paid at all,
causing widespread frustration among them. The deteriorating economy
and weakening ability of the state to deliver goods and services affected
the lives of Solomon Islanders in both rural and urban areas. Contrary to
assertions that life in rural areas continued undisturbed (Field 2003),
many village communities suffered from the inability of the state to pro-
vide education, health, transportation, and other social services. Further-
more, in the period after the Townsville Peace Agreement, many of the
murders, intimidations, and related criminal activities were committed in
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remote rural areas such as the Weather (south) Coast of Guadalcanal and
north Malaita.
These situations led to the description of Solomon Islands as a “failed
state.” The term was ﬁrst applied to the Solomons by John Roughan,
technical advisor to the Solomon Islands Development Trust, who stated,
“Solomon Islands’ lack of national security for its people guarantees it
the distinction of being the Paciﬁc’s ﬁrst failed state” (Roughan 2002, 1).
The term and the argument were both later adopted by the Economist,
which concluded, “The Solomon Islands faces the prospect of becoming
the Paciﬁc’s ﬁrst failed state” (Feb 2003, 39).
Australian authorities similarly took on the notion of the “failing
state.” The inﬂuential report from the Australian Strategic Policy Insti-
tute, for example, noted that “Solomon Islands, one of Australia’s near-
est neighbors, is a failing state” (aspi 2003, 2) and said that Australia
should be proactive in order to prevent it from being used for trans-
national crimes such as money laundering, drug trafﬁcking, people smug-
gling, and terrorism. Similarly, when announcing the proposed Solomon
Islands intervention, Australian Prime Minister John Howard told Fed-
eral Parliament that it was not in Australia’s interest to have a number of
failed states in the Paciﬁc, because “If we do nothing now and the Solo-
mon Islands becomes a failed state, the challenges in the future of poten-
tial exploitation of that situation by international drug dealers, money
launderers, international terrorism—all of those things, will make the
inevitable dealing with the problem in the future more costly, more dif-
ﬁcult” (abc Radio 2003a). About six months into the intervention, the
retrospective report of ramsi Special Coordinator Nick Warner expressed
similar reasoning for the continuing work of the intervention force. At the
National Security Australia 2004 Conference in Sydney, Warner observed
that the collapse of state institutions in the Solomons posed not only inter-
nal but regional problems:
From Australia’s perspective, intervening to ensure Solomon Islands did not
descend into chaos was now an imperative. Plainly, a dysfunctional Solomon
Islands held long term dangers for Australia and the region. A country
beholden to armed thugs is a recipe for chronic instability. Such instability is
an invitation to transnational crime. Experience elsewhere shows that weak
states are also attractive as havens for money laundering, people smuggling,
drug smuggling and terrorism. And while there was no evidence that transna-
tional criminals were targeting Solomon Islands, there was no point waiting
for this to happen. (Warner 2004, 2)
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The Howard government’s rationale for intervening in Solomon Islands
because of the imminent failure of the state closely echoed the Bush
administration’s National Security Strategy, which in turn drew attention
to failed states as not only a problem for humanitarian activities, but also
as a security concern of major proportions: Bush stated that “poverty,
weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to
terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. . . . America is
threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones” (quoted in
Underwood 2003, 4).
Similarly, conservative think-tank organizations like Australian Strate-
gic Policy Institute that had inﬂuenced the Howard government’s foreign
policies increasingly warned of the collapse and failure of neighboring
states Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands (Windybank and Manning
2002; aspi 2003). So, late in 2003 Australia committed us$325 million
and 250 Australian police ofﬁcers to addressing law-and-order problems
in Papua New Guinea (PIR, 2 Dec 2003).
The “failing state” discourse is not simply a description of what
occurred in Solomon Islands. Rather, it reﬂects Australia’s long-term per-
ception of both the Paciﬁc Islands and Australia’s role in the region. It ﬁts
comfortably with the long-term tendency of Australian policy makers,
bureaucrats, journalists, and academic political economists to represent
the region with predominantly negative images (Callick 2001; aspi 2003;
Windybank and Manning 2003). At the forefront is the image of an “arc
of instability” where “leaders are [generally] corrupt, . . . administratively
incompetent, irresponsible, duplicitous, uncaring about their children’s
futures and that they have failed to deliver ‘development’” (Fry 1997,
326). This is what, for an earlier episode of skepticism, Fry referred to as
“framing the islands” with a “doomsday image”: “The images are embed-
ded in a forthright Salvationist message that describes a region in danger
of ‘falling off the map.’ It warns of an approaching ‘doomsday’ or ‘night-
mare’ unless Paciﬁc Islanders remake themselves—just as Australians have
had to do” (Fry 1997, 305). More recently, Ben Reilly pushed the discus-
sion further when he referred to the “Africanisation of the Paciﬁc” (2000)
—comparing the problems confronting the Paciﬁc Islands to those in sub-
Saharan Africa. He later argued: “Weak governance, widespread corrup-
tion, economic mismanagement, rising crime, and violent ethnic conﬂicts
are undermining the stability of the island nations of the South Paciﬁc. As
some countries assume the status of Somalia-like ‘failed states,’ the for-
merly benign South Paciﬁc islands represent a growing threat to regional
security” (Reilly 2003, 62).
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One could argue that these kinds of descriptions reﬂect the realities in
the region. Events such as the secessionist war in the Indonesian Province
of Aceh, the troubles in West Papua (Irian Jaya), Papua New Guinea’s law-
and-order problems, the long and festering history of the Bougainville cri-
sis, civil unrest in Solomon Islands, and the Fiji coups of 1987 and 2000
are manifestations of the region’s instability.
The “failed state” discourse, and the parallel negative representation of
the region, are not simply descriptions of actual situations—not neutral
representations of realities—but are in addition a crucial justiﬁcation for
outside intervention and for Canberra’s leadership. Such discourse also
provides a prescriptive and normative statement about how states should
be organized. As a desirable benchmark, it cultivates and perpetuates Aus-
tralia’s paternalistic and patronizing relationship with the Paciﬁc Islands,
reﬂected in often-unacknowledged thinking and practice that the region
needs a stronger, wealthier, and democratically advanced country as its
leader. For example, Alexander Downer stated: “Well, the problem here
is that for Australia we are, perhaps not a problem, but the reality is we
are by far the richest country in the region and therefore there isn’t really
any alternative but for Australia to take a leadership role” (abc Radio
2003b). Similarly, Paul Kelly, the political analyst for the Australian,
wrote that Australia’s deployment of troops in Solomon Islands “is dri-
ven by the recognition that the prime source of instability today is the
failed state and that only Australia can exercise the leadership role in the
Paciﬁc” (Squires 2003).
It was the combination of these factors—Australia’s role in the war
against terror, the failing Solomon Islands state, Australia’s negative rep-
resentation of Island countries, and its self-perception as leader and supe-
rior arbiter of regional affairs—that, together, contributed to Canberra’s
decision to intervene. Consequently, they were also the factors that inﬂu-
enced the approach employed by the regional assistance mission in its
work in Solomon Islands. 
Intervention and Solomon Islands Future(s)
Two of the major objectives of the ramsi intervention were restoring law
and order and rebuilding the nation. So far, there have been marked
improvements in law and order. By November 2003, for instance, more
than 3,700 weapons (including 660 high-powered military weapons) were
removed from the community, and 733 people were arrested on 1,168
charges between 24 July and 24 December 2003 (sibc News, 20 Nov,
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24 Dec 2003). A review of the Royal Solomon Islands Police is aimed at
building a professional police force. Rogue police ofﬁcers have been
removed from the force and a number of them have been arrested and
charged with criminal misconduct. 
The public service is being reviewed with the objective of curbing mis-
management, maladministration, and corruption, and improving efﬁ-
ciency and effectiveness. By early 2005, the economy showed signs of
improvement—the country was servicing its loans and public servants
were being paid on time. This was due partly to better management of the
country’s ﬁscal matters, but more to huge injections of aid. The Solomon
Islands 2004 budget was funded largely by aid donors: they were esti-
mated to contribute to 24.6 percent of revenue and 100 percent of the
development expenditure (sig 2003).
So far, much of the ramsi focus has been on creating an effective and
efﬁcient state that would rebuild the nation, resolve the civil unrest,
address its underlying causes, do a better job of delivering goods and ser-
vices, and discourage (if not prevent) terrorists from using the Solomons.
While the state-centered approach might be the most rational for both
Australia and Solomon Islands, the questions raised at the beginning of
this article, and more, must be considered: Who controls the state? Would
the establishment of an effective state lead to a loyal nation—one with a
collective consciousness, and in some way committed to a shared identity
and mission? Is the state capable of restoring relationships between for-
mally conﬂicting parties? How will the intervention affect the process of
peace building and nation rebuilding? Will the intervention address the
underlying causes of the civil unrest? 
To answer these questions, the nature of the Solomon Islands state and
its place in the local society must be examined. The Solomon Islands state
has always shared and competed for control of society with other entities,
including churches, nongovernmental organizations, traditional political
organizations and leaders, and “special interest” groups such as women’s
and youth organizations. In what Joel Migdal refers to as the “state in
society” relationship (2001), the state’s authority over society is often
measured relative to other entities by its monopoly over violence, its
ability to impose order, and the nature and degree of its control over
resources.
Since Solomon Islands independence in 1978, the state, while impor-
tant, was often not the most inﬂuential institution in most people’s every-
day life, and its control over important resources has been limited. Eco-
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nomically, for instance, the state has depended largely on harnessing nat-
ural resources, primarily from lands and nearshore areas owned by cus-
tomary owners. Prior to the civil unrest, much of the state’s revenue came
from the exploitation of forests, minerals, ﬁsheries, and estate crops.
Except for ﬁsheries, all these resources are drawn from land, around 87
percent of which is under customary ownership. It is unlikely that the tra-
ditional systems of land tenure will change dramatically in the near future.
Consequently, it is likely that at the end of ramsi operations the state will
revert to depending on resources it does not own and has little control
over. 
Apart from economics, most communities usually mobilize their activ-
ities and achieve particular objectives around churches, local big-men, or
women’s organizations. These are often the basis for resolving conﬂicts
and rebuilding group and personal relationships. Despite the law-and-
order problems since 1999, many of these social agents of local mobi-
lization have not disintegrated, although some have become dormant out
of fear, frustration, and intimidation by those with guns. In actual conﬂict
resolution in Solomon Islands, the state often plays a secondary role. For
this reason, it is vital that other entities—churches, landowners, com-
munity leaders, women’s organizations, youth groups, civil society—fea-
ture prominently in the complex processes of peace building and nation
rebuilding. There is a need to look beyond the state for ways in which
Solomon Islanders themselves could be involved, although state and
ramsi assistance would be helpful. 
In the longer term, the question of who controls the state is vital.
Despite the rhetoric about working in collaboration with the Solomon
Islands government, ramsi leader Nick Warner, a civilian, exercises sig-
niﬁcant control, which on some issues borders on pervasive. Further-
more, Australians have been placed in important line positions in such
institutions as the police and justice, ﬁnance, customs and excise—in gen-
eral, all of the public service departments responsible for revenue collec-
tion and ﬁnancial management. At present, to a large extent, the Solomon
Islands state is inﬂuenced, if not directly controlled, from Canberra. 
Apart from the Australian focus, aid donors and international institu-
tions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary
Fund, Asian Development Bank, and European Union have the ability to
impose a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂuence through the conditions attached
to their aid; the same is true for major overseas donor countries, includ-
ing the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Japan.
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The European Union, for example, has offered funds to the Solomon
Islands College of Higher Education (siche), conditional on considerable
restructuring. Because such restructuring has yet to be done, the Euro-
pean Union has withheld its funding. As a result, by May 2004 the col-
lege was not yet opened; the only siche school open was New Zea-
land–funded School of Education. 
The state is also under the control of local politicians whose personal
opportunism has resulted in questionable reputations and performance.
For instance, Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza was implicated in a
scandal when he was deputy prime minister in the previous government
led by Manasseh Sogavare. At the time of Kemakeza’s election as prime
minister in 2001, his public declaration of being “friends” with militants
raised concerns about the nature of his relationship with them and their
criminal activities. The ramsi intervention propped up his position and
sheltered him from parliamentary and public challenges. At the time he
requested intervention from Australia, there were rumors that former
members of the Malaita Eagle Force—his “friends”—were about to
request millions of dollars worth of “compensation” from the govern-
ment, because their privileged relationship had deteriorated. 
A second question is whether an effective and efﬁcient state could
invoke common symbols, heroes, memories, and myths among the cul-
turally and ethnically diverse communities that constitute Solomon Islands
and, more crucially, whether it is capable of creating what Benedict
Anderson has called an “imagined community” (1991). The state-centered
approach assumes that an effective state apparatus could not only impose
order and deliver goods and services but also create a loyal nation and
harmony among a body of people who feel they are its citizens. This
assumption is evident from the ramsi “nation-building” objectives and
the way in which they carry out their operations. 
This situation is not unique to Solomon Islands. On 22 October 2001,
Newsweek published an editorial titled “Next: Nation Building Lite,” in
which author Fareed Zakaria expressed concern about the power vac-
uum being created in Afghanistan, while commending President Bush for
shifting his position on nation building to support “the stabilization of a
future government.” Zakaria declared: “We have no option but to create
some political order in that country. Call it nation building lite” (2001,
53). The goal, in both Afghanistan and Solomon Islands, was to turn these
countries not into Jeffersonian democracies, but into at least quasi-func-
tioning states where roads, bridges, and water supplies would be restored,
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violent conﬂicts and law-and-order problems ended, and an institutional
climate established to ensure that terrorists did not use failed states venues
for launching attacks on western countries (Croucher 2003, 6).
Third, in order for real and lasting peace to be achieved—the absence
of violence, the presence of justice, and the restoration of social relation-
ships—there is a need not only to reinstate law and order but also to
repair relationships between parties formerly in conﬂict. So far, the ramsi
focus on law and order favored retributive justice, hence the huge num-
ber of people arrested and charged. This creates a favorable impression
in the short term, but in the longer term Solomon Islanders must consider
the question of how the judicial system can cope with processing the huge
numbers of cases, the price of keeping people in prison, and the more
basic reality of people’s relationships being extremely difﬁcult to restore
and repair. This is especially important in a society where wrongs com-
mitted are often perceived as not between two individuals, but between
groups: families, lineages, and communities. Generally, Solomon Islanders
do not see imprisoning one individual as a way of mending basic social
relationships.
While Canberra’s doctrine of the “failed state” focuses on state infra-
structure, some Solomon Islanders consider that greater emphasis should
be accorded to leadership. They argue that poor leadership, especially
among those elected nationally, is one of the country’s most serious prob-
lems. Central Bank Governor Rick Hou, for example, was reported to
have stated that the country’s economic problems could be attributed to
the “rottenness” of leadership (sibc News, 21 Nov 2003). He asserted
that unless the crisis of leadership was addressed, Solomon Islands would
continue to face serious socioeconomic problems. 
Similarly, leading Solomon Islander academic Kabini Sanga argued:
“The Australian-led and New Zealand–supported external armed inter-
vention (called “helpem fren”) in the Solomon Islands is dealing with a
minor issue. The real crisis, the one requiring priority attention, is leader-
ship” (2003, 5). He suggested, “The ‘helpem fren’ mission should quickly
give way to a New Zealand–facilitated (not led) ‘iumi wantok’ (we are
neighbours) strategy, aimed at supporting the strengthening of leadership
capacity and a culture of leadership” (Sanga 2003, 7).
John Roughan, for many years a regular commentator on the Solomon
Islands political economy, stated that the country’s problems “show up
our leaders’ special talent for destroying the country by lining their own
deep greedy pockets ﬁrst” (2002, 2). Similarly, Transform Aqorau, the
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ﬁrst Solomon Islander to earn a doctorate in law and currently the legal
advisor to the Paciﬁc Islands Forum Secretariat, stated that the problem
in Solomon Islands lies in the “inept politicians it has had for the past
twenty-ﬁve years. There is nothing wrong about the country and its peo-
ple. The problem has been the failure of its leaders to rise to the challenge
and responsibility which they carry. Unless there is a sea of change that is
fundamental enough to ensure good, honest leadership at the highest ech-
elons of government, Solomon Islanders will continue to suffer the con-
sequences of poor leadership” (Aqorau 2003, 1). It is true that ramsi
leaders did say no person was above the law. On 18 November 2003,
Daniel Fa‘afunua, the minister for communication, aviation, and meteo-
rology, was arrested and charged with a number of criminal offenses and
later sentenced to three years in jail. 
How can the crucial leadership problem be addressed? This is not an
issue that outside intervention can resolve, nor is it one that can easily be
addressed through institutional changes. It involves the more basic chal-
lenge of changing the culture of leadership over a long period of time.
Conclusion
Australia’s willingness to lead the Paciﬁc Islands Forum regional interven-
tion into Solomon Islands cannot be understood by looking at what hap-
pened in Solomon Islands alone. It is also necessary to examine changes
in the global security discourse, especially approaches to the war against
international terrorism. Australia became an important player through its
partnership with the United States and Great Britain. 
The decision to lead the regional intervention force into Solomon
Islands was a “preemptive strike” to prevent the threat of terrorist attack
on Australia, its citizens, and its interests in the region. Canberra became
interested in Solomon Islands only when it became an important piece of
Australia’s foreign policy “jigsaw puzzle.” 
The intervention was justiﬁed by the “failing state” discourse, which
argued that the Solomon Islands state was collapsing and prone to being
used by terrorist organizations. The decision was made easier because of
Canberra’s long-term negative representation of the Paciﬁc Islands, and its
perception of its role as leader, protector, and superior arbiter of regional
affairs.
Foreign intervention, while useful in the short term, does not offer an
easy solution to internal problems. It might create a quasi-functioning
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state that is able to restore order and serve the interests of the interven-
ing forces, but it often does not address the underlying causes of civil
unrest, nor can it build long-term peace.
Moreover, in the Solomon Islands case, the focus on the state, while
important, must not be allowed to overshadow other entities that could
contribute positively to peace building and nation rebuilding. It is neces-
sary to restore not only a functional state but also relationships between
people.
Finally, for intervention to be successful it must cultivate a capacity for
positive change within the country; otherwise it reinforces a culture of
dependency. The role of the intervening force must be one of facilitating
positive development rather than dictating it. In Solomon Islands, Aus-
tralian interests and discourses must not be privileged over those of Solo-
mon Islanders. If that happens Solomon Islanders will continue to say
“letem olketa ramsi kam stretem”—wait for ramsi to come and ﬁx it. 
* * *
Some of the ideas in this paper have been explored in a shorter paper (Kabu-
taulaka 2004). I am thankful to Murray Chapman, Judith Bennett, Sitiveni Hala-
pua, and Grey Fry for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am,
however, solely responsible for the contents and arguments of this paper.
Note
1 cdc stands for the “Commonwealth Development Corporation,” the Brit-
ish conglomerate that owns the oil palm plantation at the Guadalcanal Plains,
which is managed by its subsidiary, the Solomon Islands Plantation Limited
(sipl). The numbers, for example cdc5, refer to the blocks.
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Abstract
The Australian government’s decision to lead a Paciﬁc Islands Forum regional
intervention into Solomon Islands marked a dramatic change in Australian policy
toward the Solomons in particular and the Paciﬁc Islands region in general. It
demonstrated Australia’s willingness to play a more assertive role in the domes-
tic affairs of Paciﬁc countries. The decision also reﬂected fundamental changes in
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the global security environment following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the
United States and the perception that international terrorism has made it difﬁcult
to separate external and internal security. Canberra was inﬂuenced by the idea
that terrorists could use “failed states” to pose security problems for Australia
(and other western countries). While Australia’s concerns about its own security
as well as the inﬂuence of Anglo-American security policies have led the Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands to concentrate on rebuilding the Solomon
Islands state, this paper argues that the post-conﬂict nation building process must
include other institutions besides the state—such as churches, community leaders,
nongovernmental organizations, women’s groups—that already have an inﬂu-
ence on society. This is particularly important for Solomon Islands, a country
where there have always been multiple centers of power, with the state not always
the most important. Further, post-conﬂict nation building must also involve the
mending and rebuilding of relationships between peoples while ensuring that for-
eign assistance does not create a culture of dependency.
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ership
